Beyond Discrete Biases
Human Judgment as a Socially Situated Process

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Research on epistemic vigilance has shown that people routinely calibrate their trust on others according to their perceived competence and honesty (Mascaro & Sperber, 2009). Hence, if people exert epistemic vigilance toward others' judgments to avoid misinformation, forewarnings (i.e., the possibility of being biased or *misinformed*) may work as an efficient debiasing strategy when they are presented with others' judgments compared to when they are presented with a piece of information without a specific source.

To test this idea, we conducted a initial study with the goal of reducing the anchoring effect via access to others' responses. In an adapted version of the classical anchoring paradigm, participants answered to general-knowledge questions after considering possible answers (anchors) either allegedly given by a previous participant in the study or without a specific source. Besides, participants were forewarned, or not, about the anchoring effect in a 2(source/no-source) X 2(forewarning/no-forewarning) design.

We predicted and found that participants distrust others and adjust away from their responses only when forewarned that people usually show an anchoring effect. Furthermore, in a second study including response-time measures, we not only replicated the initial results but also showed that participants in the source/forewarning condition took longer to respond when compared to the control (no-warning/no-source) group. These results suggest deliberate adjustment away from the anchors triggered by epistemic vigilance (follow-ups of these initial studies will also be presented).